• Graph-based software watermarking: Software can be realized as a graph G where nodes of the graph are
represented by a sequential instruction set and edges are the branch instructions that transfer control from one instruction to another instruction. Represent a node by n i = {s i1 , . . . , s i k i } where k i is the number of instructions in node n i . An edge e i,j represents a branch instruction from n i to n j .
Watermark is contained in another independent program, also represented by a graph G . The purpose of watermark embedder is to add G and G such that it is computationally infeasible for the attacker to nd the right cut that separates G, G . The watermarked software graph G w = G + G .
The rst graph-based software watermarking scheme was proposed by Venkatesan et al. [1] . Software and watermark codes are converted to digraphs and extra edges are added between these two digraphs by adding function calls. The authors propose to implement a random walk for the selection of the next node to be visited during the embedding process.
But this walk is not truly random. Let the next node to be visited be n, nodes remaining in the software be N s and nodes remaining in the watermark be
there is a high probability that the nodes selected towards the beginning belong to the software and the nodes selected towards the end belong to the watermark. Hence the watermark is skewed towards the tail of the watermarked program. Other papers in graph-based software watermarking are available for readers' consideration in [2] [6] . Instruction and block re-ordering attacks remain to be a problem for all these models.
• Register-based software watermarking: Watermark is embedding in the order of the registers that are used to store variables. Register-based software watermarking based on the QP algorithm (named after authors Qu and Potkonjak) [7] , [8] is presented in [9] . If two variables are required at the same time, it does not matter which register stores which one of the two variables. Thus the registers that store the two variables can be swapped. The watermark is encoded in the ordering of registers. Register reallocation is an obvious and direct attack against such watermarking scheme. Secondary watermarking also destroys the old watermark.
• Thread-based software watermarking: Just like they are encoded in the ordering of registers in the previous case, watermarks are encoded in the ordering of threads in this case [10] . If there are 2 threads;
The threads that execute program code can be manipulated by the attacker in a bid to destroy the watermark.
• Obfuscation-based software watermarking: Objectoriented programs can be watermarked using this wa- To work around such problems and others, Myles and Jin propose a ngerprinting scheme in [14] . comprising of two algorithms -embed and recognize.
• P → original software, • F P → ngerprint,
The embed algorithm is explained below, 1) Let F be the set of functions that lie in the execution path when the program is run with input sequence key AM , letF be the set of the remaining functions in P .
2) Let the number of unconditional branch statements in functions in F andF be n and m respectively. The ngerprint is a concatenation of generated keys.
Since each user has a distinct initial key key F M , each user also has a distinct ngerprint. Thus the embed algorithm satis es the basic condition of a ngerprint that no two users should have the same ngerprint.
The watermarked program P w , secret input key AM and the initializing key key F P are provided to the recognize algorithm which returns the authorship mark AM and ngerprint F P . Running P w with input sequence key AM executes functions in F generating the ngerprint
. AM is recovered from the one-way hash function Myles and Jun's watermarking scheme [15] . Major portion of this attack is automated and manual inspection is kept to a minimal making it an extremely practical attack.
In this section, this attack is described in detail. 
Note that the generation of new keys no longer requires the attacker to compute integrity check. 
T [h(k i )] = d i
FingerprintF P generated is different from the original key sequence F P as the individual keys are different.
Proof:
Algorithm recognize(P , key F P , key AM ) will output F P ,Ã M upon execution establishing the attacker's ownership over the software.
V. SURVIVING THE DEBUGGING ATTACK
In this section, we analyze the debugging attack discussed in the previous section and identify the assumptions on which the attack is based. Further, we shall propose way(s) to counter-attack these assumptions and thus secure the software from any attempts of removing or modifying the watermark.
The basic assumption we take is that the source code is available to the attacker for inspection. This is a strong assumption taking into account that most commercial softwares do not come with the source codes. However, We have a typical scenario where a source instruction I s needs to transfer control to a target instruction I t . I s calls FBF which manipulates the stack pointer and returns the control to I t . Addressing the rst indicator, the code that performs stack pointer modi cations can always be written in a higher language and thus it is not necessary that FBF contains assembly level code.
The stack pointer modi cation in FBF is the basis of Gupta and Pieprzyk's attack. If FBF does not perform this extremely visible and conspicuous stack pointer modi cation and only returns the value of generated key to I s , then I s can add compute the displacement, add it to the stack pointer and transfer control to I t . Given this process, the attack FBF cannot be identi ed and all subsequent steps of the attack fail. Another advantage is that the attacker can no longer get the values of all displacement values by placing two breakpoints at the start and end of FBF (which is the case in [14] ). We can achieve this task by shifting the stack pointer modi cation instruction from FBF to function containing I s . ii) Generate k i using k i−1 , IC i , AM from the one-way hash function SHA 1 . Thus an attacker has to place n pairs of breakpoints to nd the correct target addresses. Thus, manual component complexity increases from O(1) in the previous scheme to O(n) in our proposed scheme. Security against other attacks such as additive or subtractive attacks remains the same as in [14] .
. Return t n (target n)
] ] X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X A I u u k k k k k k k k k k k k k k In this paper, we have presented modi cations on [14] so that the watermarking scheme can withstand debugging attacks like the one suggested in [15] . Figure 4 . In our proposed scheme, source instruction calls the ngerprint branch function which computes the key and returns the key back to the source instruction. The source instruction then computes the target address using this key and transfers control to the target instruction.
